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We study the eﬀect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician
incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment de-
cisions that diﬀer from those they would chose in the absence of incentives. We set
out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do
in fact induce physicians to deviate from a standard guided only by patient interests
and professional medical judgement. Our empirical evaluation of the model relies
on details of the HMO’s incentive contracts and access to the ﬁrm’s internal expen-
diture records. We estimate that the HMO’s incentive contract provides a typical
physician an increase, at the margin, of $0.10 in income for each $1.00 reduction
in medical utilization expenditures. The average response is a 5 percent reduction
in medical expenditures. We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence that ﬁnancial incentives
linked to commonly used “quality” measures may stimulate an improvement in
measured quality.
11. Introduction
Since Coase’s (1937) landmark paper on the theory of the ﬁrm, economists
have devoted increasing attention to the internal workings of organizations. An
important development in this literature is the empirical study of incentive sys-
tems within organizations. Using data derived from the internal records of ﬁrms,
economists have documented how explicit and implicit incentives shape organiza-
tional structure and performance.1 Our research contributes to this new empirical
literature by studying incentives in a setting that has received relatively little at-
tention from economists, but which has important implications for public policy:
physician incentives in managed care organizations.2
Americans spend more than one trillion dollars annually on health care. Be-
cause physicians play a central role in the allocation of these vast resources, policies
and practices that inﬂuence physician decision making have been the subject of
high stakes litigation and intense public controversy. Much of this attention has
focused on managed care organizations, because managed care organizations are
the dominant form of health insurance in the United States (with 92 percent of all
individuals possessing employer-provided health insurance enrolled in some form of
managed care, Gabel et al., 2000). A key component of every managed care orga-
nization is a system of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives that reward physicians
for limiting medical expenditures. These incentives are controversial to the extent
they induce physicians to take actions on behalf of patients that diﬀer from those
1 Examples include: Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) on the internal labor market
of a large corporation; Lazear (2000) on piece rates in Safelite Glass; Ichniowski, Shaw
and Prennushi (1997) on human resource practices in steel mills; Landers, Rebitzer
and Taylor (1996) on career incentives and work hours in law ﬁrms; Gaynor and
Gertler (1995) on incentives and risk spreading in medical practices. Prendergast
(1999) and Gibbons (1997) oﬀer comprehensive reviews of this literature.
2 See the surveys by Dudley et al. (1998) and Gold (1999) on physician incentives
in managed care speciﬁcally, and Newhouse (1996) on reimbursement incentives in
health care generally.
2they would take in the absence of incentives.
This paper studies physician responses to cost and quality incentives in a man-
aged care setting.3 The HMO we study operates a network of independent, primary
care providers (PCPs). In this type of network, HMOs contract directly with physi-
cians in independent practices (or with associations of such practices) to provide
medical services.4
Our analysis exploits two noteworthy features of the HMO’s incentive system.
The ﬁrst feature is that every primary care physician in the network was assigned
the role of a “gatekeeper” who regulates access to medical resources. Thus the
HMO required that each enrollee (as HMO members were called) select a PCP,
and the chosen PCP was then responsible for all the medical expenditures incurred
by the enrollee. The contract speciﬁed ﬁnancial rewards for PCPs with average
medical utilization expenditures below a target level. The second key feature of
the HMO’s incentive system is that the incentive contracts were group-based, i.e.,
they rewarded the performance of panels of primary care physicians rather than
individual doctors. These panels of doctors (known as PODs) varied in size from 3
to 30 physicians. As we discuss in more detail below, these PODs were haphazardly
assembled by the HMO with little attention given to the possibility that group
incentives are likely to be more powerful the smaller the size of the POD.
The approach we take to understanding the HMO’s incentive system integrates
a theoretical model with data provided by the HMO. Our theory oﬀers a framework
3 Firms in this industry adopt a variety of organizational forms, such as health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and point-
of-service plans (POSs). All of these plans seek to limit medical expenditures by
selectively contracting with health care providers, and most also attempt to control
care via ﬁnancial incentives for doctors. See Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000)
for recent work decomposing the savings achieved by managed care plans between
price and quantity reductions.
4 These types of networks are referred to as “Independent Provider,” or “IP” networks.
These rarely studied entities comprise one of the largest segments of the managed
care market, roughly 40 percent of total HMO enrollment in 1998 (InterStudy, 1999).
3for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts induce physicians to deviate
from expenditures they would have made if guided only by patient interests and
professional medical judgements. We use this framework to analyze the spending
patterns in the HMO’s network of primary care physicians. Our empirical strategy
relies on variation in the size of physician panels and variation over time in the
contractual arrangements to identify cross-sectional and time-series variation in
incentive intensity. We study the eﬀect of incentives by examining correlations
between average medical expenditures and incentive intensity.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe in more
detail the relevant institutional features of the HMO’s incentive system. In Section
3 we set out a model of how physicians might behave in such a system. Our model
clariﬁes the beneﬁts that group incentives oﬀer in the HMO context. Indeed, we ﬁnd
that the use of group incentives can lead to a more eﬃcient allocation of resources
among the HMO’s patients than incentives geared towards individual physicians.
Section 4 contains empirical results. The data we use were taken from the
records the HMO used to administer its incentive system. These data track the
medical expenditures for each enrollee and attributes these expenditures to the
enrollee’s PCP. Using these data we are able to characterize how incentives inﬂuence
marginal expenditures.
In the last year of our study the HMO introduced ﬁnancial incentives for PCP
panels that met certain “quality” targets. We turn, in Section 5, to an analysis
of the eﬀect of these quality incentives. The ﬁnal section of the paper contains a
summary and conclusions.
2. The Incentive System
As noted above, the HMO managed a network of independent, primary care
providers. The HMO contracted directly with individual providers (or with associa-
4tions of such practices) to provide medical services. The HMO provided contractu-
ally speciﬁed ﬁnancial rewards to PCPs who met spending targets and, in the ﬁnal
year of our study, to those who also scored well on certain quality indicators. Al-
though the terms of these contracts could and did change from one year to the next,
all PCPs in the network in a given year worked under identical incentive contracts.
2.1. The System from 1991 through 1996
For the years 1991 through 1996, the HMO used the same incentive contract
for all its primary care physicians. Under the terms of the contract, the HMO
agreed to reimburse PCPs for services they provided at 125 percent of Medicare’s
fee schedule.5 Only 80 percent of these fees, however, were paid immediately to the
physician. The remaining 20 percent were “withheld” and paid out at the end of
the year to physicians whose PODs had average medical expenditures below target
levels. In addition to getting their “withhold” returned, panels coming in under
target were eligible for a “gain-sharing” bonus which returned to the POD one-
half of the diﬀerence between actual and targeted utilization expenditures. Thus,
physicians in PODs with average costs below target could expect a substantial
“bonus” of no less than twenty percent of their total fees.
Spending targets were constructed as follows. Each enrollee was assigned an
actuarially determined monthly budget based on the enrollee’s age and gender, the
specialty of the primary care physician, and forecasts of changes in the demand for
and price of medical services.6 The target for the POD was constructed by summing
up the budgeted expenditures for all enrollees for whom the POD’s physicians were
responsible. All health care utilization expenditures were included in the spending
target except expenditures for dental care, pharmacy, mental health and substance
5 This fee schedule is known as the resource based relative value scale (RBRVS).
6 Primary care specialties include internists, family practice, pediatrics and obstetrics/
gynecology.
5abuse services, neonatal intensive care, and any expenses above $15,000 accrued by
an individual enrollee in a year. This last feature, known as a “stop-loss” provision,
was important as it removed incentives to withhold care from the sickest (or most
expensive) patients.
A critical feature of the HMO’s incentive system was the construction of the
PODs. In their written material, the HMO emphasized that doctors decided which
PODs they wish to join, but the actual construction of the panels seems to have
been quite haphazard. No one we spoke with could reconstruct the process by which
physicians ended up in the PODs they did, and no records were kept regarding the
decision process. In some instances, it appears that the HMO arbitrarily assigned
physicians to panels (typically to increase the number of enrollees in the POD), but
little attention was given to the possibility that the intensity of incentives might
be diluted as the number of physicians in the POD increased. In other cases,
physicians joined panels because they were in the same practice or because they
were located close to or had other social/professional relationships with other panel
members. As a result of the way these panels were constructed, otherwise similar
PCPs were grouped into quite diﬀerent PODs. Panel sizes ranged from 3 to 30.
Some PODs include pre-existing group practices, while others did not.7 In some
PODs all physicians had the same specialty, while others were a mix of diﬀerent
primary care specialties.
An obvious concern in evaluating the behavioral impacts of the HMO’s group
incentives is the selection of physicians into PODs. We know that physicians did
move across panels, but as we show in the following empirical analysis, there does not
appear to be a signiﬁcant relationship between a physician’s patient expenditures
7 The HMO did not require that panels be composed of corporate entities or part-
nerships, but such entities were sometimes included in the construction of a POD.
Only 11 percent of the PODs in our sample were composed of a single entity for the
purposes of receiving payment from the HMO.
6and the decision to change panels. We also note that the HMO did not and could
not steer patients towards low-cost physicians or PODs in its network. Once a
patient signed up with the HMO, she was free to use any physician in the network.
Similarly, the HMO did not engage in “economic credentialing.” This means that
as matter of policy and practice, the HMO did not try to force high cost PCPs
out of its network. Once a PCP agreed to join the network and once the PCP
passed the network’s screening process, continued participation in the network was
not inﬂuenced by the level of expenditures chosen on behalf of the PCP’s enrollees.
Another issue in assessing the impact of incentives is whether the PCP “gate-
keeper” could plausibly exert a substantial inﬂuence on medical expenditures. After
all, the fees accruing to PCPs for the services they deliver account for a relatively
small fraction of total medical utilization costs.8 This issue was especially impor-
tant in the HMO we study because once an enrollee was referred by the PCP to a
specialist, the specialist was free to order further tests and procedures without the
approval of the enrollee’s PCP.
In informal conversations we learned that at least some PCPs in the network
believed they could exert a substantial inﬂuence on medical expenditures. Three
strategies stood out in these discussions. The ﬁrst was to keep patients with con-
gestive heart failure, diabetes, asthma or other chronic diseases out of the hospital
by teaching patients how to better manage these diseases themselves. The second
was to keep patients from using hospital emergency rooms by having extended oﬃce
hours and very good message handling systems. The third strategy was to reduce
specialist referrals by learning more about which types of cases needed to be re-
ferred and which could be safely handled by PCPs themselves. One physician, for
example, claimed his POD dramatically reduced expensive referrals to dermatol-
8 In the HMO we study, PCP fees were approximately 20 percent of total utilization
costs.
7ogists when the PCPs underwent training to spot which conditions needed to be
referred and which could be safely treated by the PCP.
2.2. Changes in 1997
The incentive system we have described was essentially unchanged from 1991
through 1996. In 1997 the rules changed. New Federal regulations required that the
HMO reduce the intensity of cost-control incentives. Federal law mandated that no
more than 25 percent of physician pay could be “at risk.” The HMO responded by
reducing the withhold to 10 percent, while continuing to use the same fee schedule.
In addition, they replaced the ”gain-sharing” bonus with a new system that capped
bonuses at 15 percent of income and, importantly for what follows, linked bonuses
to both cost and quality targets. The quality targets consisted of specialty speciﬁc
preventive care measures (e.g., proportion of patients immunized for pediatricians,
proportion receiving mammograms for gynecologists), and some other measures
such as patient satisfaction, oﬃce inspections, and patient turnover.9
3. A Simple Theory of Group Incentives
The essence of the HMO’s incentive system is easily summarized. For each
patient, a target expenditure level is established. PCPs who inﬂuence expenditure
decisions are members of groups (PODs). If, on average, the physicians in the group
hold expenditures at or below the target, the physicians receive a substantial bonus.
In this section we lay out a model which allows us to understand the nature of this
group incentive and to derive testable predictions concerning its eﬀect on physician
behavior.
It is helpful at the outset to think about the HMO’s goals. The HMO’s long-run
9 In the new system introduced in 1997, the HMO ranked by expenditures all PODs
who came in under their spending targets. The top quartile of these PODs got 7.5
percent of fees as a bonus. This same set of PODs were then ranked by quality and
the top quartile got 7.5 percent of fees as a bonus. PODs that did less well in cost
containment or quality got smaller bonuses.
8viability in the marketplace hinges on its ability to balance two objectives—on the
one hand providing health care that is viewed as high quality, and on the other hand
providing health insurance at a reasonable price. Firms and their employees who
contract with the HMO presumably understand that the HMO will be providing
incentives to physicians to prevent excessive health expenditures. These clients must
be conﬁdent that the incentive eliminates “wasteful” expenditures (e.g., reduces the
use of high cost medical procedures that have low expected value to patients) while
still encouraging physicians to act in a fashion that does not substantially deviate
from the best interests of their patients.
3.1. A Model of Physician Behavior
To ﬁx the central idea about the HMO’s role in the market, consider a physician
who derives utility from money (y) and from the medical services (m) provided to
patients. It is natural to think about the doctor’s utility as decreasing in the extent
to which m is less than some “ideal” level, b m.10
We conceive of b m as representing the level of medical services the patient
would want the physician to provide if the patient did not bear any of the costs of
treatment. Patient preferences enter the physician’s utility function because norms
of professional conduct require the physician to advocate for the patient’s interests
and because physicians value good relationships with their patients. Thus in some
cases, b m may represent the acknowledged medical best practice for treatment of a
patient with a speciﬁc illness. Providing a less expensive and less eﬀective treatment
would cause disutility for the physician even if the patient could not judge for himself
what best practice was. In other cases b m may be inﬂuenced by patient preferences
that diﬀer from the physician’s conception of best practice treatments. For example,
a patient may insist on a medically unnecessary MRI to reduce anxiety about the
10 Our model is tailored to the speciﬁc institutions and issues we examine. See McGuire
(2000) for an excellent review of the general literature on models of physician behavior.
9presence of a brain tumor. A physician who decides not to provide the MRI would
experience some disutility because of a failure to resolve the patient’s on-going
anxiety.
Whatever the precise determinants of b m, patients would prefer that the physi-
cian provide b m to any alternative level of services, if those services were provided at
no cost. Patients who pay for medical services, though, would prefer to contract for
a level of service somewhat lower than b m.11 An important role for the HMO is to
set in place incentives that accomplish the goal of inducing doctors to set medical
services below b m, but not by “too much.” This task is complicated to a considerable
degree by the fact that neither patients nor the HMO administration know b m.
As an especially transparent example consider a doctor with n patients (i =
1,...,n), whose utility is given by a simple quasi-linear form,
U = y −
n X
i=1
v(mi − b mi),
with v0 < 0 and v00 > 0 when mi < b mi.12 Since an HMO in a competitive market will
want to maximize patient satisfaction for any given level of medical expenditures,
we begin by considering how this doctor would ration medical care subject to a
ﬁxed budget (
P
mi = M), but no further ﬁnancial incentives. The doctor would
follow the rationing rule,
−v0(m∗
i − b mi) = λ, i = 1,...,n. (1)
Not surprisingly, the doctor would allocate limited resources so that the marginal
disutility from rationing care (relative to the patient’s ideal) is equated across pa-
tients.
11 Since b m is a patient’s unconditional optimum, it lies on a ﬂat spot in the patient’s
objective function. A small reduction in m from this level has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on
medical care expenditures, but a second-order eﬀect on the patient’s well-being.
12 Given these assumptions, preferences are convex and utility is increasing in both y
and m1 over the relevant range(mi < b mi).
10In what follows, we show that the HMO can induce the physician to follow this
same optimal allocation rule by adopting an easily implemented bonus scheme.
We assume that the HMO management cannot observe b mi, the ideal for patient
i, or even the level of medical expenditures intended by the physician, mi. Instead
the HMO observes
xi = mi + εi,
where ε is a mean-zero random variable reﬂecting the fact that the physicians in
the HMO have imperfect control over medical expenditures. The mean of this
random variable has probability and cumulative distribution functions φ and Φ,
respectively.13 Think of the random variable as representing the fact that physicians
do not have complete control over medical expenditures.
Suppose that the HMO oﬀers a per-patient bonus, B, that is awarded only
if, average expenditures on medical services in a year are below a speciﬁed target,
i.e., only if X = 1
n
Pn
i=1 xi < XT, where XT is the target. The HMO also directly
compensates observed xi at the expected opportunity cost to the doctor (think of
mi as being scaled in dollar value of the opportunity cost of services).14 The implied
budget constraint is





When the doctor maximizes utility [y −
Pn
i=1 v(mi − b mi)] subject to this budget
constraint, the resulting ﬁrst-order conditions are
−v0(m∗
i − b mi) = Bφ(XT − m∗), i = 1,...,n, (2)
where m∗
i is the optimal choice.
13 In our empirical work below, we assume that ε has a normal distribution, but here
we need only assume that the mean of the random variable meets the monotone
likelihood ratio property.
14 In addition, there might be a lump-sum transfer between the doctor and the HMO
to insure that the participation constraint is met, but this is not important to our
discussion here since it does not aﬀect incentives.
11Figure 1 illustrates the doctor’s problem. The budget constraint slopes down-
ward in the (y,mi) plane. The curve labelled V = V0 is an indiﬀerence curve for the
physician, with the “U” shape reﬂecting the physician’s dislike for deviation from
the b mi ideal. As depicted in Figure 1, the optimal choice is m∗ < b m.
We have three observations. The ﬁrst is the equivalence of the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions (1) and (2). The HMO’s bonus incentive induces the same allocation rule
an individual doctor would adopt if presented the task of rationing a ﬁxed level of
medical services to a given pool of patients. Secondly, we observe that although
the bonus scheme we describe is discrete, the eﬀective expected budget constraint is
likely a smooth downward sloping function in each argument E(y) = y(m1,...,mn)
because of the stochastic nature of the outcomes. Third, the HMO can clearly inﬂu-
ence the doctor’s level of medical service provision (m∗
i) by adjusting the incentive
payments (B) and by altering the target spending level (XT). However, the doctor’s
chosen service levels also depend on the ideal levels (b mi) which are unobservable
by the HMO, and indeed are stochastic from the HMO’s perspective. Thus for
any chosen bonus level and target, the gap between m∗
i and b mi will depend on the
unobservable clinical needs and preferences of the patients.
From equation (2) it is apparent how the stochastic component of the problem
aﬀects the extent to which the physician deviates from the ideal. Speciﬁcally, m∗
i will
be close to b mi when the doctor lands in either tail of the expenditure distribution.
When a doctor has an unusually sick (hence expensive) patient load, achieving the
target is unlikely. In this case, the marginal eﬀect of any treatment decision on the
probability of making the target (φ) is low. Similarly for a doctor with an unusually
healthy (hence inexpensive) patient population, the marginal eﬀect of any treatment
decision on the probability of making the target (φ) is also low. In both these cases,
the physician can more easily “aﬀord” to be generous in treating any patients who
do need medical attention.
123.2. Why Group Incentives?
The rationale for implementing a bonus scheme on a group basis—rather than
a physician-level basis—follows directly from the observations made in the previ-
ous paragraph. We have seen that a simple physician-level bonus plan provides
doctors with the incentive to reduce medical expenditures in a sensible manner, by
equalizing across patients the marginal disutility of rationing medical services. If
the HMO uses a physician-level incentive bonus, however, this marginal disutility
of allocating medical care is not necessarily equalized across doctors, even when
doctors have identical preferences. Thus two identical patients (with the same b mi)
will receive diﬀerent levels of medical services m∗
i if they choose diﬀerent primary
care physicians who have patient populations with diﬀerent average medical costs.
The HMO can seek to reduce this disparity by adjusting the physician’s target
on the basis of observable patient characteristics (like age and gender), but this is a
partial remedy because risk adjusting is imperfect. An additional step for reducing
the disparity in treatment is to group physicians, and provide a bonus based on
observed group outcomes. Suppose doctors are placed into a POD of N doctors,
and given a group incentive. If the average observed level of medical services for the
group is less than a given target, a per-patient bonus B is awarded. We assume that
doctors allocate the bonus in proportion to their share of patients (this is typically
the case in the HMO we study). We assume also that doctors play Nash strategies.
Let there be N doctors, designated by j, with nj patients treated by doctor j.
Each doctor’s share of the group’s patients is then sj =
nj
n , where n =
PN
j=1 nj.








ij − b mij)
#
,
where mj is the average level of medical expenditures for doctor j and m−j is the
13mean for other doctors in the group. The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
−sjBφ(XT − m) − v0(m∗
ij − b mij) = 0, i = 1,...,n. (3)
We assume that the second order conditions,
sjBφ0 (XT − m) − v00(m∗
ij − b mij) < 0, i = 1,...,n. (4)
also hold.
Notice that pooling patients across doctors can reduce the diﬀerence across
patients in the marginal disutility of rationing care. Indeed if all doctors have equal
size patient loads (so that sj is the same for all physicians in the POD) and also
have identical preferences concerning patients, the marginal disutility of rationing
care is equalized across all patients in the POD.15
In the HMO we study there is some indication that the designers of the system
understood the potential gains from group incentives, but their understanding of
the economic logic of these gains was imperfect.16 As a result, they allowed for the
formation of PODs which diﬀered substantially in size and in the patient shares of
PCPs within PODs.
This variation is fortunate for our purposes because our theory provides a clear
prediction about how medical expenditures should vary with share. In particular,







sjBφ0(XT − m) − v00(m∗
ij − b mij)
< 0.
15 The larger the POD, the greater the number of patients for whom this allocation
property holds. Why then doesn’t the HMO organize all the physicians in the network
into a single POD? As the ﬁrst-order conditions make clear, the larger the POD, the
more dilute will be any bonus incentive. As we have noted, the bonus size is limited
by law. Even it were not, physician risk aversion (which we do not model here) would
mitigate against allowing the size of the bonus (and hence the size of the POD) to
become excessively large.
16 They clearly understood that in small panels random variation could cause some
PODs to be too far above or below cost targets. This, for example, was the rationale
for grouping otherwise unconnected PCPs into PODs.
14Thus, all else equal, physicians who have a small share of the PODs patients will pro-
vide higher levels of medical services than physicians with larger shares. Similarly,
per patient expenditures will be higher in large PODs (where physicians generally
have relatively low shares) than in small PODs. We turn next to physician-level
and POD-level data to evaluate these predictions.
4. Empirical Evidence
In this section we ask whether the HMO’s incentive system had the eﬀect of
reducing medical expenditures. Our strategy is to examine the correlation between
medical utilization spending and the intensity of incentives to limit these expendi-
tures.
The data we use comes from the HMO’s internal records and is available at the
PCP level and the POD level. We have data from the roughly 1000 PCPs and 100
PODs in the network over the years 1994-1997. Section 4.1 focuses on the individual
PCP-level data. We begin the section by imposing some additional structure on our
theoretical model in order to derive a simple and estimable empirical model. Taking
this “structural” approach to the data allows us to test our basic hypothesis while
also uncovering some otherwise hard to observe aspects of the incentive system.
In section 4.2, we analyze POD-level rather than PCP-level data. While the
POD-level equations lack the clear structural interpretation of the PCP level esti-
mates, they do exploit the fact that the HMO kept far more detailed records at the
POD than the PCP level. We use these additional data to check the robustness of
the results in section 4.1. In addition, we use the POD-level data to analyze the
types of expenditures for which the HMO incentive system matters.
4.1. Physician-Level Analysis
4.1.1. Econometric Speciﬁcation
The theoretical model in the previous section leads to a simple speciﬁcation for
15a physician-level expenditure equation. Recall that all doctors are assumed to have
preferences described by
U = yj −
n X
i=1
v(mij − b mij),
with v0 < 0 and v00 > 0 for m < b m. For the purposes of empirical implementation
we introduce an assumption about the form of the utility function: let v(mij − b mij)
be the function α(mij − b mij)2.
Given this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst order conditions (3), for doctor j who has
share sj within the panel, can be written
sjBφj + 2α(m∗
ij − b mij) = 0, i = 1,...,n.






[sjBφj] + b mij. (5)
Neither we nor the HMO observe m∗
ij, but the HMO does record realized expendi-
tures, xij, which we have assumed are related to m∗
ij by
xij = mij + εij.
Substituting this last equation into (5) we obtain,
xij = b mij −
Bφj
2α
sj + εij. (6)
We assume that the sum b mij + εij is equal to a linear combination of observed
characteristics (β0 + β2Zij) plus an error term uij.
We have data on average annual medical expenditures by physician. Let xjt
be the mean of xi in year t for doctor j and ujt be the mean of ui for the same
physician in year t. We assume ujt is orthogonal to sjt.17 The equation we estimate
is thus
17 In short we are assuming that unobserved components of physician j’s expenditures
are uncorrelated with physician j’s share of the POD’s members. Our POD-level
analysis relaxes this assumption.
16xjt = β0 + β1φjsjt + β2Zjt + ujt, (7)
where φj is speciﬁc to the POD in which doctor j is a member. We do not observe
φj directly, but it can be estimated, as discussed shortly. If our assumptions are
correct, we can give β1 a structural interpretation, β1 = − B
2α. The value of B is
determined by the incentive contract that is common across physicians in a year,
while α is an unobserved parameter that determines the relative importance of
income and deviations from “ideal” medical expenditures for physician utility.
Our identiﬁcation strategy is straightforward: the slope of physician j’s budget
constraint is Bφjsj. This varies across physicians because of variation in φjsj
(especially sj, as it turns out). Doctors with a share near 0 essentially have a ﬂat
budget constraint, and will choose m∗
ij very close to b mij for their patients, while
doctors with a relatively large share have a relatively steep budget constraint, and
will choose reduced medical expenditures relative to b mij. This variation allows us
to map physician responses to incentives, and in turn to identify the parameter α.
We can estimate equation (7) using a simple two-stage procedure outlined
below.18 An obvious alternative strategy is to simply apply ordinary least squares
to the equation,
xjt = γ0 + γ1sjt + γ2Zjt + ujt. (8)
We interpret the parameter γ1 as an “average” of
−Bφ
2α , and we expect it to be
negative.
4.1.2. Estimation Results
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 present estimates based on expenditure equations
(7) and (8) respectively. We derive the estimates in column 1 as follows: First, we
18 The simplifying assumptions of our model enable us to implement an unusually trans-
parent structural estimation procedure. There is relatively little work in the incentives
literature that applies structural estimation, and papers that do take this approach
(e.g., Ferrall and Shearer, 1999) generally employ more complicated methods.
17estimate a probit model predicting the probability that PODs meet the incentive.
Second, we use these estimates to form ˆ φj for each doctor.19 Equation (7) is then
estimated using OLS, treating ˆ φj as “data.”20 In both equations Z consists of
dummy variables for year and specialty eﬀects. Finally, due to the changes in the
incentive system in 1997, we interact the key incentive variable with a 1997 dummy.
These 1997 interaction terms are estimated quite imprecisely and we ignore them
in the following discussion.
The estimated coeﬃcients on Physician’s Share of POD’s Member-months * φ
(equivalent to ˆ β1 in equation 7) and Physician’s Share of POD’s Member-months
(equivalent to ˆ γ1 in equation 8) are both negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels, consistent with our hypothesis that a doctor with a larger share
of a group’s patients should have lower expenditures.
According to our structural interpretation of column (1), Physician’s Share of
POD’s Member-months * φ = ˆ β1, thus ˆ β1 is estimated to be -128.7. From equation
(6), ˆ β1 = − B
2α. Since the bonus B is approximately $3.00, the implied value of α is
0.012.21
Recall that the ﬁrst order conditions for physicians are
−sjφjB = 2α(m∗
ij − b mij).
The left-hand side describes the slope of the “budget constraint,” and hence the
“power” of the incentive scheme. The right-hand side is the marginal rate of sub-
19 The probit estimates are contained in a table in the Appendix.
20 Because φj is estimated, conventional standard errors are not appropriate. We use
a two-step, clustered bootstrap procedure to arrive at the standard errors. In step
one we estimate ˆ φj for 100 replications (clustered at the POD level) of the probit
predicting whether or not the panel exceeded it’s target. For each of these 100
estimates, we ran 100 replications of the individual medical expenditure equation
(clustered at the PCP level). The standard errors of the coeﬃcients taken from the
resulting 10,000 replications are reported in column 1 of Table 2.
21 This estimate of B assumes a bonus of a little more than 20 percent of an average
PCP’s monthly expenditure of $14.61 per member per month, approximately the
HMO’s withhold for an average physician.
18stitution between income and deviations in medical expenditures from the “ideal”
levels that would prevail in the absence of cost considerations. If the doctor has
a near zero share of the POD’s patients, medical expenditures will approximately
equal b mij.22 If the doctor has a share of 0.1 (the sample mean) and φ of 0.33 (also
the sample average), the slope of the budget line (sjφjB) is −0.10. In this case
a physician who prescribes a medical procedure that costs $100 has an expected
decline in income of $10. We estimate that for this doctor, the absolute value of
(m∗
ij − b mij) is $4.29 per member per month. This represents savings of approxi-
mately 5 percent on average medical expenditures per-member per-month of $81.
Finally, if the physician has a share of 0.2, so that the slope of the budget constraint
is 0.20, medical expenditures decline by $8.58. Physicians are clearly responsive to
ﬁnancial incentives.
Figure 2 illustrates an average physician’s estimated indiﬀerence curve for a
utility level of 1000 (picked arbitrarily), and the optimal levels of medical treatment
for that physician when share equals 0.1 (the sample average) and when share is
0.3. A physician with a share of 0.1 will reduce medical treatment 5 percent below
the “ideal” level. Increasing the share to 0.3 would induce a reduction of 15 percent.
The coeﬃcient on Physician’s Share of POD’s Member-Months in Column 2
(-40.5) has a straightforward “reduced form” interpretation. A physician with the
average patient share in our sample (0.1) will have medical expenditures that are
$4.05 (per member per month) lower than a physician who has a share of 0. Notice
that this inference is virtually identical to the estimate based on the structural
interpretation of column (1).
The savings implied by these estimates are substantial. The doctors in our
sample serviced just over 800,000 HMO member months in 1996. If all physicians
22 Of course, there are no doctors in our sample with a share of 0, but there are a
number of doctors with very small shares (below 0.01).
19had 0.1 shares of their POD’s enrollees (the sample average), the total reduction in
medical expenditures due to incentives was approximately $3.2 million. If the HMO
had placed doctors in smaller PODs, so that patient share was 0.2, expenditures
would, according to our estimates, decline another $3.2 million.
4.2. POD-Level Analysis
The results in Table 1 suggest that physician incentive contracts do have the
eﬀect of reducing medical utilization expenditures. An obvious concern with these
estimates, however, is that our measures of physician share may be correlated with
unobserved features of enrollees or physicians that have an independent inﬂuence
on expenditures. In this section we use the more extensive POD-level data to
investigate this potential omitted variable bias. In addition, we use the POD-
level data to investigate the types of utilization costs that are most inﬂuenced by
incentives.
4.2.1. Econometric Speciﬁcation
If incentives matter, we can expect that medical expenditures increase with the
number of physicians in the POD (since the average doctor’s share (sj) declines with
the number of physicians in the POD). This reasoning also suggests that reductions
in the size of incentive bonuses should attenuate the relationship between POD size
and spending levels.
Our basic regression for testing these hypotheses is:
xkt = δ0 + δ1ln(Nkt) + δ2ln(Nkt) ∗ D1997 + δ3Zkt + ukt, (9)
where xkt is the observed medical expenditures per member per month in POD k at
time t, ln(Nkt) is the log of the number of physicians in POD k in year t and D1997
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the year 1997.23 Z is a vector of variables that
23 The POD-level equations do not have the natural structural interpretation of the PCP
level equations. Our theoretical exposition suggests that the relationship between
20capture the inﬂuence of other factors that potentially inﬂuence medical expenditures
(and δ3 is a row vector of parameters).24
In terms of the parameters of the expenditure equation, our ﬁrst hypothesis
suggests that δ1 > 0. Because of the Federally mandated reduction of incentive
intensity in 1997, we anticipate δ2 < 0 (the second hypothesis above).
4.2.2. Estimation Results
Column (1) of Table 2 presents estimates of equation (9) for the years 1994-
1997.25 We observe that PODs with more physicians have higher medical expendi-
tures. This coeﬃcient is economically as well as statistically signiﬁcant. An increase
in POD size from 10 to 12 physicians is associated with an increase in expenditures
of $6.58 per member per month. This represents an increase of 7.3 percent over
the sample mean. Consistent with the reduction of incentive intensity in 1997, we
also observe a negative coeﬃcient on the POD Size*1997 interaction. Point esti-
mates suggest that in 1997, an increase in POD size from 10-12 physicians led to
an increase in expenditures of only $1.18 per member per month. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the reduction in incentive intensity that occurred 1997.
One of the “control variables” included in vector Z is Target Expenditures. This
target is the forecast of a POD’s “expected expenditures” based on enrollee age and
gender, and PCP. The estimated coeﬃcient of 0.99 on Target Expenditures indicates
an approximately 1 to 1 relationship between expected POD medical expenditures
and actual POD expenditures. The equation in column (1) also includes the variable
POD size and medical expenditures will be non-linear and concave. We use the log
speciﬁcation because it oﬀers a convenient interpretation of the coeﬃcients. Other
speciﬁcations produced similar results.
24 In the POD-level regressions Z includes variables measuring: the number of patients
in the POD (measured in patient member-months), POD network aﬃliation, spe-
cialty composition of the POD, and percent of members enrolled in Medicaid in 1997.
Details on these variables are provided in Data Appendix 1.
25 Our POD-level estimates are from a time-series, cross-section panel, and we have
adjusted standard errors to account for possible within-POD correlation of errors
and cross-panel heteroscedasticity.
21Years that POD is in Sample Since 1994. This variable is potentially important
because during the time of this study, the HMO was expanding from urban settings
into suburban areas. The positive coeﬃcient on Years that POD is in Sample Since
1994 may indicate that the older, more urban, panels were likely treating more
expensive populations of enrollees. Finally the estimates in column (1) include year
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Column (2) in Table 2 introduces an alternative dependent variable, Medical
Expenditures Net of Stop Loss. Under the HMO’s incentive system, physicians are
not held responsible for expenditures above $15,000 per patient in a year. We would,
therefore, worry about our interpretation of the coeﬃcients on Log Physicians in
POD and Log Physicians in POD*1997 if they changed dramatically when we net
out “stop loss” expenditures. We observe instead, however, that the coeﬃcients in
column (1) are virtually identical to those in column (2).
Column (3) introduces yet another dependent variable, Fraction Withhold Re-
turned. The HMO cares about regulating total medical expenditures. The physi-
cians, in contrast, care about whether they can win back the withhold. Consistent
with our theoretical reasoning, we ﬁnd that as the number of physicians in a POD
increases, the panel is less likely to win back their withhold. Point estimates in-
dicate that an increase in panel size from 10 to 12 physicians reduces the fraction
withhold returned by 0.04 or roughly 10 percent of the mean. The coeﬃcient on Log
Physicians in POD*1997 is imprecisely measured and not statistically signiﬁcant.
The estimates in columns (4) through (6) of Table 2 add additional control vari-
ables to capture heterogeneity across PODs and their enrollee populations. These
variables are described in detail in Data Appendix 1, but their coeﬃcients are sup-
pressed in Table 2 to facilitate exposition. The addition of these control variables in
columns (4) through (6) had no eﬀect on the signs and statistical signiﬁcance and
little eﬀect on the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients on our key variables of interest, Log
22Physicians in POD and Log Physicians in POD*1997. These results suggest that
our ﬁndings are not likely due to correlation between the number of physicians in
a POD and other observed characteristics of the panel, its physicians or its patient
population.
An alternative approach to controlling for unobserved POD heterogeneity is
to estimate our equations with POD-level ﬁxed eﬀect variables. These ﬁxed eﬀect
estimates are presented in columns (7) through (9) of Table 2. The coeﬃcients
on the key variables, Log Physicians in POD and Log Physicians in POD*1997
are not qualitatively changed from those in equations (1) through (6), although the
magnitude of the eﬀect of number of physicians on expenditures increases somewhat
in absolute value. Thus, in our ﬁxed eﬀect estimates, a POD that increases the
number of physicians from 10 to 12 will, for the years 1994-1996, experience an
increase in Total Medical Expenditures of $8.28 per member per month, falling to
$3.29 per member per month in 1997.
We interpret the ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients on Log Physicians in POD and Log
Physicians in POD*1997 in columns (7) through (9) as reﬂecting changed behaviors
due to the changing degree of incentive intensity. An alternative possibility is that it
is selection rather than behavioral changes that are driving our ﬁxed eﬀect results.26
It may be, for example, that Log Physicians in POD has a positive correlation with
Total Medical Expenditures because panels that reduce the number of physicians
do so by expelling their most expensive physicians. Alternatively, it may be that
panels with growing numbers of physicians are hiring new members who tend to be
more expensive than incumbents.
Table 3 oﬀers an investigation of the importance of selection eﬀects. It relies
on individual expenditure data for the HMO’s primary care physicians for the years
26 Barro and Beaulieu (2000) oﬀer evidence of the importance of selection eﬀects under
conventional insurance.
231994–1996. We use these data in Panel A to see if those leaving shrinking groups
have spending that is, on average, higher than others in their panel. We observe that
the 298 physicians who exited a panel at the end of 1994 or 1995, had expenditures
that were, on average, 2 percent higher than other PCPs in the panel they were
leaving. This diﬀerence between movers and stayers is both small in magnitude
and statistically insigniﬁcant.27 In Panel B of Table 3, we compare total medical
expenditures between incumbent physicians and new entrants in the panel. Of
the 746 new entrants in the years 1995 or 1996, we observe that entrants had
expenditures that are, on average, 1 percent higher than those in the panel they
were entering. This diﬀerence is far too small to account for the results in Table 2.
It is also statistically insigniﬁcant.
In Table 4, we explore the plausibility of our results by examining the impact
of incentives on diﬀerent types of medical expenditures. Data on the components
of spending are only available for 1994–1996. Thus we begin by re-estimating our
base model (column (1) of Table 2) for these years. The estimated coeﬃcient Log
Physicians in POD, is very close to those estimated over the full sample of years
(1994–1997).
Under the HMO’s incentive system PCPs can reduce medical expenditures in
two distinct ways. First, they can reduce the amount of income that accrues to them
via fees by reducing the number of oﬃce visits they have with patients. Alternatively
PCPs can cut expenses that accrue as fees to other health care providers, e.g., by
reducing specialist referrals. Given the payout formula in the HMO’s incentive
contracts, we would expect physicians to prefer the second method of reducing
27 To put the Panel A ﬁgures in perspective, remember that the point estimates in
column 1 of Table 2 suggest that a panel decreasing from 12 to 10 members will
experience a 7 percent reduction in Total Medical Expenditures. If the leavers in such
a panel have expenditures that are, on average, 2 percent higher than the stayers,
and if the only eﬀect from reductions in physicians in the panel were due to selection,
the reduction in expenditures would be only 0.4 percent.
24expenditures to the ﬁrst.
Column (2) of Table 4 presents estimates of the determinants of Expenditures
Not Paid to Self (pmpm). This variable measures the average per member per
month medical expenditures for procedures and treatments that do not earn rev-
enues for the primary care physician. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on Log Physicians
in POD is positive, statistically signiﬁcant, and similar in magnitude to the coef-
ﬁcient in column (1). In contrast, the dependent variable in column (3) measures
expenditures that do earn income for the primary care physician. The coeﬃcient
on Log Physicians in POD in column 3 is positive, but small in magnitude and not
statistically signiﬁcant. Taken together, the results in columns (2) and (3) suggest
that in PODs with fewer physicians (and consequently higher powered incentives),
physicians cut expenditures on services and procedures that generates fees for other
physicians. Physicians do not seem to cut expenditures on services that generate
fees for themselves.
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 compare the determinants of spending due
to in-patient and out-patient services and procedures. The dependent variable in
column (4), Total In-Patient (pmpm), tracks spending due to procedures conducted
in a hospital on an in-patient basis. We observe that the coeﬃcient on Log Physician
in POD in column (4) is small and not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Column
(5) estimates the determinants of out-patient expenses. The variable Total Out
Patient includes expenditures incurred in a hospital (on an out-patient basis), a
clinic, or a doctor’s oﬃce. In column (5) of Table 4, we ﬁnd that Log Physicians
in POD has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on out-patient spending.
The magnitude of this eﬀect is large. Increasing panel size from 10 to 12 physicians
increases outpatient spending by $1.71 per member per month or roughly 5 percent
above the mean. Taken together, the results in columns (4) and (5) suggest that
the HMO’s incentives do not have much inﬂuence on in-patient expenses, but are
25important for out-patient expenses. This ﬁnding makes sense. Patients admitted to
hospitals are likely to be sicker than other patients and therefore are less likely to
have purely elective procedures. Patients in a hospital are also more likely to have
their care decided by a specialist rather than the by the primary care physicians
and it is the PCPs who are most aﬀected by the HMO’s incentive system.28 In
contrast, out-patient procedures are more likely to be elective and more likely to
be controlled by the PCP. We would therefore expect the incentive system to work
most powerfully on these latter expenditures.29
5. Incentives Along Other Dimensions
The results in the previous sections provide evidence that HMO incentives do
motivate PCP “gatekeepers” to reduce medical expenditures. Much of the contro-
versy surrounding HMO incentive systems involves the claim that such cost-control
eﬀorts require physicians to sacriﬁce the quality of medical care. Care quality in
medicine is notoriously hard to measure, but some, admittedly imperfect, quality
metrics have become standard in the industry. Because our data include some of
these standard quality metrics, we have the opportunity to examine the quality
issue, at least with regard to measured quality.
The HMO ﬁrst incorporated quality measures into its incentive system in 1997.
As discussed above, this change was part of a general overhaul of the system to
bring it into compliance with the then new Federal regulations governing physician
incentive plans.
28 Our ﬁndings that in-patient expenditures are unresponsive to physician incentives
is consistent with recent research on HMOs by Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse
(2000). They ﬁnd that HMOs reduce the costs of treating heart attack patients (who
are largely in-patients) by reducing the money paid to providers (presumably by hard
bargaining) but not by altering the amount or type of care these patients received.
29 Stop loss provisions are also more likely to pertain for hospitalized patients, further
reducing the PCP’s incentives to reduce spending.
26Under the new system, quality incentives were linked to cost-control incentives.
Panels with a surplus in their enrollee accounts were rank ordered based on care
quality, and bonuses were paid out according to rank. A key feature of this system
is that quality payouts were conditional on keeping patient expenditures below the
targeted levels for that year.
In constructing quality measures, the HMO gave PODs points based on two
types of quality measures. The ﬁrst type of measure focused on preventive care and
included such things as the percent of women aged 50-65 who had mammograms
or the percent of children aged 3-5 who had annual well-child evaluations. This
type of measure is referred to as a HEDIS measure because the indicators were
derived from a set of standardized quality measures put forward by the Health Plan
Employer Data and Information Service (HEDIS).30 In addition to the selected
HEDIS measures of preventive care, the HMO constructed a second quality measure
based on indicators of patient satisfaction, the accessibility of the PCPs after hours
and direct oﬃce inspections. Details on the plan’s HEDIS and non-HEDIS quality
measures are presented in Data Appendix 2. As we describe in the appendix, the
non-HEDIS measures proved to be both diﬃcult to collect and of doubtful relevance
to panel quality. For this reason, we focus our analysis on the HEDIS measures.31
Table 5 analyzes the determinants of medical expenditures and quality in 1997.
Column (1) of Table 5 presents a regression of Total Medical Expenditures on HEDIS
Quality Points. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant and negative relationship between
30 HEDIS is sponsored, supported and maintained by the National Committee for Qual-
ity Assurance (NCQA), the organization responsible for accrediting managed care
organizations.
31 For two of the non-HEDIS measures (membership retention and extended hours), the
indicators were so unreliable that all panels were simply given the maximum number
of points at the end of the year. The third non-HEDIS measure (patient satisfaction)
gave maximum points to all but two panels. The fourth measure (whether the panel
was accepting new HMO enrollees) has little connection to quality of care. The ﬁfth
measure (focused oﬃce reviews) was based on criteria that were not clearly explained
to physicians.
27expenditures and HEDIS points, i.e. the panels with the best quality scores have
the lowest average expenditures. In columns (2) and (3) we ﬁnd that this negative
correlation is statistically signiﬁcant for stop-loss expenditures but not for other
medical expenditures.32
Under the incentive contract in place in 1997, payouts for measured quality were
inﬂuenced by the same “free riding” problems as payouts for spending-containment.
In addition, panels were not eligible for quality bonuses unless they also kept med-
ical expenditures under target levels. For both these reasons, we would expect
quality measures to deteriorate as the number of physicians in the panel increased.
Improvements in quality are reﬂected in an increase in the HEDIS Quality Points
measure. Thus, we expect that HEDIS Quality Points should decrease as the num-
ber of physicians in the panel increases.
Column (4) of Table 5 analyzes the determinants of the HEDIS Quality Points
earned by a panel. We ﬁnd that the number of quality points earned by a panel
falls as the number of physicians in the panel grows. The coeﬃcient is statistically
and economically signiﬁcant. Increasing the number of physicians from 10 to 12
reduces HEDIS Quality Points by 1.19, or 7 percent of the mean.
Column (5) of Table 5 re-estimates the HEDIS Quality Points equation in col-
umn (4), but introduces additional variables that measure characteristics of panels,
their physicians and enrollees. Introducing these variables has little eﬀect on the
magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on Log Physicians in POD.
The results in columns (4) and (5) are consistent with the notion that the
HMO’s incentive system is moving physicians to oﬀer both lower cost care and care
with higher measured quality. The HEDIS quality measures emphasize preventive
care and reward those panels that are best at educating and tracking their enrollees.
32 We want to emphasize that we are not attempting to estimate a causal relationship in
columns (1) - (3), but rather exploring the correlation between medical expenditures
and quality.
28These same organizational capacities may also help panels reduce expenditures. Al-
ternatively, it may be that low cost panels have high measured quality because they
are especially committed to winning incentive payouts. These panels, for example,
may ﬁnd ways to make sure their ﬂu immunization and mammography rates are
high without otherwise improving the true quality of care they deliver. The quality
measures included in the HMOs incentive system are quite crude, and they should
be treated as highly imperfect indicators of the quality of care actually delivered.
It is entirely possible that physicians are responding to the HMO’s incentives by
producing higher measured quality and shirking on non-metered aspects of quality.
Nonetheless, we are not aware of any previous estimates of the impact of physi-
cian incentives on any aspects of quality. These results suggest that physicians do
respond positively to incentives for metered quality and they raise the possibility
that properly designed incentive systems needn’t necessarily produce a reduction in
quality.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of contracts that give physicians in an HMO
network a ﬁnancial incentive to reduce medical expenditures. Our study focuses on
a particular HMO that runs a network of independent primary care physicians. We
ﬁnd that cost-containment incentives have a statistically and economically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on expenditures for patients’ medical services. Indeed, it appears that
the incentive system in place at the HMO between 1994 and 1996 reduced medical
utilization expenditures by about 5 percent. This reduction was concentrated in
spending for out-patient rather than in-patient services.
Using a similar methodology, we analyzed the eﬀect of quality incentives intro-
duced in 1997. Even though we have data for only one year and the quality metrics
are crude, we ﬁnd suggestive evidence that physicians respond to quality incentives
29by improving quality—at least for the preventative care indicators metered and
rewarded under the incentive system.
Given our focus on a single organization over a short period of time, we cannot
be certain about the extent to which our results generalize to other managed care
settings. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings suggest that critics of managed care are right
to be concerned about the eﬀects of physician incentives. In the HMO we study,
these incentives clearly do induce physicians to take actions on behalf of patients
that diﬀer from those they would choose in the absence of incentives.
At the same time, our ﬁndings suggest that supporters of managed care are
right to be concerned about policy initiatives that make it diﬃcult for HMOs to
implement eﬀective incentive systems. HMO incentive systems are found to limit
expenditures, and thus can be expected to serve an important role in reducing
the price of health care coverage. Moreover, in the HMO we examine there is no
evidence that the ﬁnancial incentives adversely aﬀected standard quality indicators
along a number of (crudely) measured dimensions.
In conducting this research we relied on three key elements: (1) detailed knowl-
edge of the structure of the organization’s incentive system, (2) a model of behavior
tailored to this setting, and (3) detailed data on the outcomes. Without all three
legs of this tripod, our ability to draw inferences about the incentive system would
have been seriously limited. For example, the incentives in place from 1994 to 1996
involved a bonus that exceeded 20 percent of physician income. Intuitively, this
might sound like a rather high-powered incentive. After all, each additional medi-
cal procedure ordered for a patient holds some probability of bumping the physician
over target, potentially costing the physician many thousands of dollars. In fact, our
empirical model shows that for a typical physician in the HMO network, expected
income falls $0.10 for every $1.00 of additional expenditures, implying a marginal
rate of substitution of -0.1. This tradeoﬀ between income and expenditures induces
30physicians to reduce expenditures by 5 percent.
Our experience in this project leads us to conclude that the development of
an empirically grounded economic theory of incentives depends on research that
combines the use of detailed knowledge of the organizational context, a carefully
developed model that is appropriate to the context, and rich data drawn from
within the organizations under study. The search for research settings with these
key ingredients will, we believe, shape the continued development of organizational
economics.
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33Table 1






Physician's Share of POD's Member-months *  -128.651
[-2.172]
Physician's Share * 1997 -295.823
[-1.228]
Physician's Share of POD Member-months -40.463
[-2.00]
Physician's Share * 1997 -138.404
[-1.56]
Constant yes yes
PCP Specialty Fixed Effects yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes
Observations 2282 2282
Number of Physicians in Sample 961 961
 R-squared 0.017 0.018
Numbers in  [ ] are t-statistics.
t-statistics in column 1  bootstrapped, allowing for clustering by physician.
t-statistics in column 2 are OLS, with robust t-statistics allowing for clustering by physician. 
The dependent variable is the annual dollars of total medical expenditures pmpm for an individual physician.
The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable are respectively 81.73 and 176.10.
For variable Physician's share*the variable  is calculated in two steps.  First we use a probit to estimate  
the probability that a POD comes in below it's target level of expenses. Second, we use the results to estimate
 , the predicted probability that the panel beats it's target costs and  , the p.d.f.
The mean and standard deviation for Physician's Share are .099 and .108 respectively. 
The mean and standard deviation for Physician's Share *  are 0.033 and 0.039 respectively. 
PCP specialties are internal medicine, family practice and pediatrics.Table 2
POD Level Expenditure Equations
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect





























Log Physicians in POD 36.168 31.911 -0.269 27.346 24.494 -0.272 46.102 46.39 -0.314
     (robust t-statistics) (2.955) (3.544) (3.157) (2.290) (2.937) (3.420) (3.017) (3.569) (2.519)
Log Physicians in POD*1997 -29.669 -29.808 0.12 -26.879 -27.531 0.149 -27.862 -23.459 0.117
(2.507) (3.208) (1.245) (2.129) (2.697) (1.628) (1.928) (1.908) (0.995)
Target Expenses (pmpm) 0.99 0.823 -0.001 0.756 0.66 0.001 0.6 0.536 0.001
(6.938) (6.074) (0.904) (3.629) (3.184) (1.177) (5.829) (6.121) (1.405)
Years POD is in Sample 9.111 6.615 -0.025 6.443 4.962 -0.013 28.607 23.679 -0.549
  Since 1994 (2.434) (2.028) (0.534) (1.409) (1.283) (0.254) (0.978) (0.952) (2.301)
Year is 1995 -14.516 -4.418 -0.011 -12.198 -5.741 -0.013 -30.865 -19.133 0.592
(1.651) (0.667) (0.148) (1.356) (0.895) (0.166) (1.015) (0.740) (2.387)
Year Is 1996 -51.834 -29.038 0.051 -47.079 -28.777 0.048 -88.932 -60.931 1.204
(4.481) (3.201) (0.492) (3.754) (2.740) (0.445) (1.524) (1.227) (2.530)
Year Is 1997 -8.909 4.868 -0.4 -17.176 -4.726 -0.283 -71.918 -50.294 1.085
(0.244) (0.149) (1.117) (0.437) (0.130) (0.821) (0.948) (0.779) (1.754)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes










POD Fixed Effects no no no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 353 353 349 340 340 339 353 353 349
Number of PODs 118 118 116 109 109 109 118 118 116
Adjusted R-squared 0.457 0.464 0.066 0.454 0.488 0.154 -0.058 -0.039 -0.384
All equations estimated using data from 1994-1997.   The median POD is in the sample for three of the four years.
1 Variables include: the log of  POD enrollees & it's interaction with 1997 dummy.  
2 Variables in note 1 (above) plus POD network affiliation, POD specialty mix, and % members enrolled in Medicaid in 1997.  
  Descriptions of these variables are available in the data appendix.Table 3
 Selction vs. Incentives: Do High Cost Physicians Exit Shrinking Panels and 
Do High Cost Physicians Enter Growing Panels?
Panel A
 Number of Physicians in POD Declines from Year t to Year  t+1:
Physician Exits Panel After Year t no yes All
yes Relative Costs Year t 1.02 1.02 1.02
Number Physicians in Cell 257 41 298
no Relative Costs Year t 0.99 1.003 0.995
Number of Physicians in Cell 678 338 1016
All Relative Costs Year t 0.998 1.005 1.000
Number of Physicians in Cell 935 379 1314
Panel B
 Number of Physicians in POD Increases from Year t-1 to Year t:
Physician Enters in Year t no yes All
no Relative Costs Year t 1.00 0.98 0.99
Number Physicians in Cell 678 338 1016
yes  Relative Costs Year t 1.06 1.01 1.01
Number of Physicians in Cell 45 701 746
All Relative Costs Year t 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Physicians in Cell 723 1039 1762
"Relative Costs" is the physician's total medical expenses in year t relative to the panel's total medical expenses in year t.
None of the cross-cell difference in the panel are statistically significant.
In panel A, t refers to years 1994 and 1995.  In panel B, t refers to years 1995 and 1996.
In panel A, of the physicians in the sample, 298 exited the panel after years 94 or 95.  The relative costs of these exiters 
   was 2% above the mean of their POD for both shrinking and growing PODs.
In panel B, of the physicians in the sample, 746 entered the panel in years 95 or 96.  The relative costs of these entrants 
   was 1% above the mean of their POD.  This 1% differential also held for growing PODs.
We restrict data to 1994-1997 because a change in the HMOs accounting systems made it difficult to track those who
   move across PODs between 1996 and 1997.Table 4
 Medical Utilization Expenditures by Category
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS






Not Paid to 
Self (pmpm)
Expenditures 








Log Physicians in POD 26.227 24.062 2.165 5.055 9.512
(2.110) (1.932) (1.364) (0.674) (2.020)
Target Expenses (pmpm) 0.627 0.55 0.077 0.224 0.31
(2.156) (2.334) (1.274) (3.331) (1.852)
Years POD is in Sample 11.319 9.64 1.679 5.162 5.583
  Since 1994 (1.250) (1.144) (1.420) (1.356) (1.156)
Year is 1995 -16.521 -14.995 -1.527 -14.621 -0.905
(1.512) (1.409) (1.361) (2.353) (0.201)
Year Is 1996 -54.104 -50.957 -3.147 -30.488 -9.794
(2.918) (2.910) (1.264) (4.439) (1.030)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes
Additional POD Level Variables
1 yes yes yes yes yes
(0.785) (0.443) (2.135) (0.820) (0.098)
Observations 236 236 236 236 236
Number of PODs 99 99 99 99 99
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.414 0.393 0.176 0.472
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in ( ) for OLS estimates.
All equations estimated using data from 1994-1997. 
1 log POD enrollees, POD network affiliation, POD specialty mix, and % members enrolled in Medicaid in 1997.  
  Descriptions of these variables are available in the data appendix.Table 5
Determinants of HEDIS Quality Measures 1997
















HEDIS Quality Points -0.805
(3.744)
HEDIS Quality Points -0.666
(3.343)
HEDIS Quality Points -0.138
(1.532)
Log Physicians in POD -6.628 -5.663
(2.857) (2.157)
Target Expenses (pmpm) -0.095 -0.03
(1.779) (0.555)
Years POD is in Sample 4.529 4.425
Additional POD Level Variables
1 no no no no yes
Observations 107 107 107 107 104
Adjusted R-squared 0.101 0.096 0.009 0.287 0.309
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in ( ) for OLS estimates.
1 Variables include: the log of POD enrollees,  POD network affiliation, POD specialty composition, and % POD 
    enrollees with Medicad in 1997 
  Descriptions of these variables are available in the data appendix.Data Appendix 1
Variable Names and Descriptions
(Tables 2, 4, 5)
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Notes
Dependent Variables
Total Medical Expenditures (pmpm) 89.56 65.60 8.82 583.09 The sum of expenditures due to in-patient and out-patient procedures, 
professional services and "other" expenditures, minus the amount paid 
by other insurers.  
  Total In Patient Expenditures (pmpm)
# 28.76 33.46 0.00 263.99 sub-category of total medical expenses available for 1994-1996.
  Total Out Patient Expenditures (pmpm)
# 35.39 31.43 5.27 306.48 sub-category of total medical expenses available for 1994-1996.
Fraction Withhold Returned 0.50 0.49 0.00 1.00 Fraction of withheld fees returned to POD at end of year.
Expenditures Paid to Self (pmpm)
# 14.49 11.28 0.00 107.52 Utilization Expenses that Accrue as Income to the referring PCP's.
Expenditures Not Paid to Self (pmpm)
# 84.83 67.75 8.82 475.57 Total Medical Expenses - Expenditures Paid to Self.
Hedis Quality Points
@ 16.08 13.52 0.00 50.00 Described in second data appendix.
Other Variables
Log Physicians in POD 2.16 0.53 1.10 3.56 Log of the number of physicians in POD.
Log Member-months 8.48 1.69 2.71 11.27 Log of the number of HMO membermonths at the panel.
Single Specialty POD 
1  0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 POD physicians all in one specialty: either internal medicine, family 
practice, pediatrics or ob/gyn.
Target Expenses (pmpm) 79.42 36.51 14.92 265.79 Level of per member per month expenditures at which withhold is 
returned and below which bonuses are paid.
% Medicaid > 10 in 1997 1  0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable  = 1 when % medicaid > 10% of panel's patient 
population. HMO began accepting Medicaid in Feb. 1995, but it remained 
very small (and wasn't counted separately) until 1997.
Year is 1995 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable = 1 when year is 1995.
Year Is 1996 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable = 1 when year is 1996.
Year Is 1997 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable = 1 when year is 1997.
Years POD is in Sample Since 94 2.27 1.04 1.00 4.00
POD In Network 1 
1  0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable indicating panel is part of larger network.
POD In Network 2 
1  0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable indicating panel is part of larger network.
POD In Network 3 
1  0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable indicating panel is part of larger network.
POD In Network 4 
1  0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable indicating panel is part of larger network.
POD In  Network 5 
1  0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable indicating panel is part of larger network.
Fraction POD Internal Medicine 
1  0.30 0.41 0.00 1.00
Fraction POD Pediatrics 
1  0.26 0.39 0.00 1.00
Data Appendix 1Data Appendix 1
Variable Names and Descriptions
(Tables 2, 4, 5)
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Notes
Fraction  POD Family Practice 
1  0.25 0.38 0.00 1.00
POD Only OB/GYN 
1  0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
# Data available for 1997 only
@ Data available for 1994-96 only
1 one of the "Additional POD Level Variables" in Tables 2, 4 and 5
Data Appendix 1Data Appendix 2
Probability of POD's Withhold Being Returned
Probit
Dependent Variable All Withhold Returned
Log Physicians in POD -0.873
     (robust t-statistics) [3.65]






Target Expenses (pmpm) 0.002
[0.85]
Years POD is in Sample -0.102
  Since 1994 [0.70]
Year is 1995 -0.082
[0.34]
Year Is 1996 0.241
[0.78]
Year Is 1997 -0.571
[0.57]
Single Specialty POD 0.016
[0.08]
% Medicaid > 10 in 1997 0.093
[0.36]
POD In Network 1 1.304
[3.34]
POD In Network 2 1.726
[3.94]
POD In Network 3 -0.81
[1.80]
POD In Network 4 0.762
[2.27]
POD In  Network 5 0.499
[1.23]
Fraction POD Family Practice -0.19
[0.38]
Fraction POD Internal Medicine 0.333
[0.63]
Fraction POD Pediatrics 0.561
[1.09]





Number of PODS 109
Wald chi2(20)     75.8
Prob > chi2   0
Psuedo R
2 0.1448
Robust z statistics in brackets
Dependent variable equal to 1 if POD got 100% of it's withhold returned and 0 otherwise.Data Appendix 3 
Quality Incentives 1997 
Quality incentives were the sum of points awarded for two types of quality measures: quality of 
care/preventative care measures and other measures of patient satisfaction.  The first category was 
referred to within the HMO as HEDIS measures.   These measures varied by specialty.  
HEDIS Quality Measures (50 points maximum) 
Pediatrics: 
-  One point given for each percentage point above 70% compliance with age specific 
immunizations for children aged birth to 2 years.  
-  One point given for each percentage point above 60% compliance with annual well child 
examination for children aged 3-5 years. 
Internal Medicine: 
-  One point given for each percentage point above 60% of a mammogram in the past 24 
months in women age 50-65. 
-  One point given for each percentage point above 50% of patients with high risk medical 
conditions or age 65+ having received an annual influenza vaccine. 
Family Practice: 
-  One point given for each percentage point above 70% compliance with age specific 
immunizations for children aged birth to two years. 
-  One point given for each percentage point above 60% of a mammogram in the past 24 
months in women age 50-65. 
OB/GYN 
-  One point given for each percentage point above 60% of a mammogram in the past 24 
months in women age 50-65. 
-  One point given for each percentage point above 65% of women 18-65 with a Pap test in 
the past three years. 
Non- HEDIS Quality Measures (50 points maximum + Medicaid Supplement) 
-  Panels given 10 points and then points were deducted for families requesting a change in 
PCP for perception of poor quality of care or poor provider/patient relationships.  
Deductions varied with size of panel.  In 1997, problems with indicator led to all panels 
being assigned 10 points.  This indicator was improved and continues to be used in the 
HMOs incentive system. -  Points awarded based on patient satisfaction results from the annual patient satisfaction 
survey.  This measure proved to be uninformative.  All but 2 panels in 1997 got the full 10 
points for this measure. 
-  Points awarded to PCPs offering regular office hours outside of M-F, 8AM to 5PM.  In 
1997 problems with indicator led to all panels being assigned 10 points. 
-  Fraction of physicians open for accepting new patients from the HMO times 10. 
-  Points awarded on the basis of a focused office review, a kind of "white glove" inspection 
of office facilities including checks of medical records. 
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Figure 2: Optimal m for differing values of sj 